“Till at last there remain nothing”



Hume’s Treatise 1.4.1 in contemporary perspective by Peijnenburg, Jeanne & Atkinson, David
 1	
	
“Till	at	last	there	remain	nothing”	
Hume’s	Treatise	1.4.1	in	contemporary	perspective	
	David	Atkinson	and	Jeanne	Peijnenburg	University	of	Groningen	The	Netherlands		(forthcoming	in	Synthese	in	Open	Access)		
Abstract	In	 A	 Treatise	 of	 Human	 Nature,	 David	 Hume	 presents	 an	 argument	 according	 to	which	all	knowledge	reduces	to	probability,	and	all	probability	reduces	to	nothing.	Many	have	criticized	this	argument,	while	others	find	nothing	wrong	with	it.	In	this	paper	we	explain	that	the	argument	is	invalid	as	it	stands,	but	for	different	reasons	than	have	been	hitherto	acknowledged.	Once	the	argument	 is	repaired,	 it	becomes	clear	 that	 there	 is	 indeed	 something	 that	 reduces	 to	 nothing,	 but	 it	 is	 something	other	than	what,	according	to	many,	Hume	had	in	mind.	Thus	two	views	emerge	of	what	exactly	it	is	that	reduces.	We	surmise	that	Hume	failed	to	distinguish	the	two,	because	 he	 lacked	 the	 formal	 means	 to	 differentiate	 between	 a	 rendering	 of	 his	argument	that	is	in	accordance	with	the	probability	calculus,	and	one	that	is	not.			
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1.	Introduction		The	 section	 ‘Of	 scepticism	 with	 regard	 to	 reason’	 in	 David	 Hume’s	 A	 Treatise	 of	
Human	Nature	 (Book	 1,	 Part	 4,	 Section	 1)	 continues	 to	 play	 on	 the	 philosopher’s	mind.	 After	 an	 apparent	 lull,	 William	Morris	 attracted	 renewed	 attention	 to	 it	 in	1989:		 	“If	we	ever	are	to	understand	Hume’s	view	of	the	role	of	reason,	…	we	should	 first	 figure	out	how	 to	 integrate	 ‘Of	 scepticism	with	 regard	 to	reason’	into	the	picture”.1				In	response	to	Morris’s	appeal	many	interpretations	were	advanced,	which	greatly	improved	 and	 deepened	 our	 understanding	 of	 this	 “least	 understood”	 passage	 in	Hume’s	writings	(ibid.).		 ‘Of	scepticism	with	regard	to	reason’	aims	to	show	the	absurd	situation	that	will	result	if	we	rely	purely	on	reason,	ignoring	habit,	custom,	and	the	sensitive	part	of	our	natures.	As	David	Owen	has	pointed	out,	the	text	consists	of	three	arguments,	two	 negative	 and	 one	 positive;	 the	 positive	 argument	moreover	 incorporates	 the																																																									1	Morris	1989,	58.	Slightly	earlier	the	section	in	question	had	also	been	discussed	in	Fogelin	1983	and	Fogelin	1985,	albeit	critically.	
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conclusion	of	 the	 section	as	a	whole.2	 In	 this	paper	we	concentrate	on	 the	 second	negative	 argument,	 which	 is	 the	 one	 that	 has	 received	 the	 most	 attention.	 The	majority	 of	 the	 philosophers	who	 studied	 this	 argument	 think	 it	 is	 incorrect,	 but	there	are	also	quite	a	few	who	believe	there	is	nothing	wrong	with	it.	We	shall	argue	that	the	argument	 is	 invalid	as	 it	stands,	but	for	different	reasons	than	have	so	far	been	acknowledged.	However	it	can	be	repaired,	and	then	it	becomes	clear	what	is	the	problem:	the	argument	is	open	to	two	reconstructions,	one	that	is	in	accordance	with	 the	probability	 calculus	 and	one	 that	 is	 not.	We	 surmise	 that	Hume	 failed	 to	distinguish	between	 the	 two,	a	 failure	 that,	we	argue,	 is	 inadvertently	 revealed	by	David	Owen's	reading	of	the	argument.		 Before	going	into	the	details,	let	us	briefly	recall	all	three	arguments.	The	first	negative	 argument	 encompasses	 the	 idea	 that	 “knowledge	 degenerates	 into	probability”	 (T	 1.4.1.1)	 or	 that	 “all	 knowledge	 resolves	 itself	 into	 probability”	 (T	1.4.1.4).3	 The	 upshot	 is	 that	we	 can	 never	 be	 certain	 of	 knowing	 a	 proposition	p,	even	if	 it	 is	the	case	that	we	indeed	know	p.	For	example,	we	might	have	correctly	carried	out	a	long	calculation	and	in	that	sense	be	said	to	know	the	outcome,	but	at	the	 same	 time	be	 unsure	 about	whether	we	were	 really	 correct:	we	do	not	 know	that	we	know.4	In	this	case	we	only	believe	with	a	certain	probability	that	we	know	we	have	carried	out	the	calculation	correctly.		 The	 second	 negative	 argument	 has	 been	 given	 various	 names:	 ‘Hume’s	probability	argument’,	 the	 ‘probability	reduces	 to	nothing	argument’,	 the	 ‘iterative	probability	 argument’,	 or	 the	 ‘regression	 argument’.5	 	 Basically	 it	 is	 like	 the	 first	negative	 argument,	 but	 now	 applied	 to	 probability	 judgements,	 including	 the	probability	 judgement	that	we	made	about	whether	we	carried	out	the	calculation	correctly.	We	cannot	be	certain	that	the	latter	judgement	is	correct;	at	best	we	can	believe	 it	 with	 a	 certain	 probability,	 so	 that	 we	 have	 a	 second-order	 probability	judgement	 about	 a	 first-order	 probability	 judgement.	 But	 of	 course	we	 cannot	 be	certain	of	the	second-order	probability	judgement	either;	at	best	we	can	only	have	a	third-order	 judgement	about	the	second-order	 judgement,	and	so	on.	According	to	Hume	this	series	of	higher	and	higher-order	probability	judgements	will	reduce	the	first	probability,	until,	if	the	regress	is	infinitely	long,	the	first	probability	will	vanish	completely:	“at	last	there	remain	nothing	of	the	original	probability,	however	great	we	may	suppose	 it	 to	have	been,	and	however	small	 the	diminution	by	every	new	uncertainty”	(T	1.4.1.6).		 Together	the	two	negative	arguments	entail	 “a	 total	extinction	of	belief	and	evidence”	 (T	 1.4.1.6).	 This	may	 be	 a	welcome	 conclusion	 for	 “those	 sceptics,	who	hold	that	all	 is	uncertain,	and	that	our	 judgment	 is	not	 in	any	 thing	possest	of	any	measures	of	truth	and	falsehood”	(T	1.4.1.7),	but	Hume	hastens	to	say	that	he	is	no																																																									2	Owen	1999;	Owen	2004.	3	 A	 Treatise	 of	 Human	 Nature,	 1739.	 References	 to	 this	 work	 are	 given	 by	 ‘T’,	 followed	 by	 four	numbers,	which	indicate	Book,	Part,	Section,	and	paragraph	as	 in	the	volume	edited	by	D.F.	Norton	and	M.J.	Norton,	Oxford	University	Press,	2006	(first	published	2000).		4	 In	Cartesian	 terms:	we	 lack	 transparent	 clear	 and	distinct	 ideas.	Nowadays	one	would	 call	 this	 a	breakdown	of	the	KK-principle,	according	to	which	knowing	p	implies	knowing	that	one	knows	p,	in	symbols:	Kp	→	KKp.	5	DeWitt	1985;	Lolordo	2000,	433;	Loeb	2010,	327;	Meeker	2000;	Fogelin	2009,	43.	
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part	 of	 “that	 fantastic	 sect”	 (T	1.4.1.8).	He	 recalls	 that	we	do	 have	 beliefs,	 both	 in	philosophy	and	in	daily	life.	From	this	he	however	does	not	draw	the	conclusion	that	the	negative	arguments	are	fallacious;	on	the	contrary,	although	the	arguments	are	“entirely	 superfluous”	 (T	 1.4.1.7),	 Hume	 indicates	 that	 one	 “can	 find	 no	 error”	 in	them	(T	1.4.1.8).		 The	negative	arguments	sketch	the	grotesque	scenario	that	would	appear	if	our	reasoning	were	left	to	its	own	devices.	Reason	would	then	annihilate	itself	and	the	beliefs	it	produces	would	“terminate	in	a	total	suspence	of	judgment”	(T	1.4.1.8).	Fortunately,	this	unnatural	scenario	will	never	come	to	pass	—	and	that	is	the	gist	of	the	 positive	 argument.	 This	 argument	 makes	 us	 understand	 that	 reasoning	 is	“deriv’d	 from	 nothing	 but	 custom”,	 and	 that	 belief	 is	 “more	 properly	 an	 act	 of	 the	
sensitive,	than	of	the	cogitative	part	of	our	natures”	(T	1.4.1.8).	Thus	“nature	breaks	the	 force	 of	 all	 sceptical	 arguments	 in	 time,	 and	 keeps	 them	 from	 having	 any	considerable	 influence	 on	 the	 understanding”	 (T	 1.4.1.12).	 In	 its	 entirety,	 ‘Of	scepticism	with	 regard	 to	 reason’	 offers	 a	 reductio:	 it	 aims	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 a	regress	of	subjective	probability	judgements	leads	to	an	absurdity.6		 Especially	 the	 negative	 arguments	 in	 Section	 1.4.1	 have	 been	 subjected	 to	many	 different	 interpretations;	 and	 although	 these	 interpretations	 have	significantly	improved	our	understanding,	there	is	as	of	yet	no	agreement	on	how	to	deal	with	the	arguments.	One	of	the	disagreements	concerns	the	question	whether	formal	 tools,	 notably	 from	 modern	 probability	 theory,	 can	 serve	 to	 clarify	 the	matter.	 Some	 scholars	 think	 they	 can,	 for	 example	 Fred	 Wilson,	 Richard	 DeWitt,	Robert	Fogelin,	Kevin	Meeker,	and	in	the	early	days	Popkin,	Quine,	Von	Wright,	and	Peirce.7	 Others	 however	 are	 strongly	 against	 using	 formal	 devices.	 	 Thus	 David	Owen	writes:	 “[W]hat	Hume	 is	 concerned	with	 in	 these	negative	arguments	 is	not	some	formal	assignment	of	probability,	calculated	according	to	the	calculus”.8		 Both	formalists	and	anti-formalists,	as	we	will	call	them	for	convenience,	rely	on	 their	 own	 reasonings.	 	 Thus	 anti-formalists	 tend	 to	 point	 out	 that	 a	 formal	interpretation	 leads	 to	 glaring	 inconsistencies	 in	 Hume’s	 text,	 and	 to	 the	 unlikely	conclusion	that	Hume,	beside	defending	a	sceptical	position,	also	embraces	a	form	of	dogmatism.	Formalists,	on	the	other	hand,	bring	to	mind	Hume’s	talk	about	degrees	of	 probability	 and	 his	 suggestion	 that	 these	 can	 be	 measured.	 They	 explain	 that	formal	 probability	 theory	 was	 very	much	 in	 vogue	 during	 Hume’s	 lifetime:	 Jacob	Bernoulli’s	Ars	Conjectandi	had	just	been	published,	and	Hume	was	a	contemporary	of	 Thomas	 Bayes	 (1702-1761),	 whose	 famous	 essay	 on	 probability	 was	posthumously	published	by	Hume’s	knowledgeable	friend	Richard	Price.9	Although																																																									6	Cf.	Meeker	2013,	55	ff	(‘The	reduction	strategy’).	7	Wilson	1983;	Wilson	1985;	DeWitt	1985;	Fogelin	1985;	Meeker	2000;	Popkin	1951;	Quine	1946;	Von	Wright	1941;	Peirce	1905.	8	 Owen	 2015,	 116.	 Don	 Garrett	 is	 of	 the	 same	 opinion	 (cf.	 Garrett	 2004;	 Garrett	 2006).	 The	disagreement	 about	 whether	 Hume’s	 arguments	 can	 be	 fruitfully	 evaluated	 with	 the	 help	 of	probability	 theory	 is	 	 not	 restricted	 to	 his	 regress	 argument	 in	 1.4.1.	 A	 similar	 dispute	 applies	 for	example	 to	 his	 argument	 about	 miracles.	 For	 an	 in-depth	 use	 of	 formal	 tools	 to	 clarify	 Hume’s	assertions	 about	 the	 credence	 to	 be	 given	 to	 a	 testimony	 that	 a	miracle	 has	 occurred,	 see	 Ahmed	2015.	9	Hacking	1975;	Daston	1988.	
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Hume	 himself	 may	 not	 have	 been	 particularly	 well-versed	 in	 eighteenth	 century	probability	 theory,	 he	 knew	 that	 such	 a	 theory	 existed,	 and	 that	 some	 of	 his	contemporaries	were	making	significant	contributions	to	it.10			 In	this	paper	we	will	give	a	formal	analysis	of	the	second	negative	argument;	however,	as	we	shall	see,	our	approach	differs	essentially	from	that	of	the	formalists	mentioned	above.	We	begin	in	Section	2	by	citing	the	regress	argument	as	it	appears	in	Treatise	1.4.1.	In	Section	3	we	illustrate	the	argument	by	giving	an	example,	which	we	 then	 analyze	 in	 the	 standard	 formalist	 manner	 of	 Peirce,	 Von	Wright,	 Quine,	Popkin,	 DeWitt,	 Wilson,	 Fogelin	 and	 others.	 Although	 the	 approaches	 of	 these	scholars	 differ	 in	 details,	 they	 all	 explicitly	 or	 implicitly	 assume	 that	 the	 regress	argument	 is	 based	 on	 a	 simple	 multiplication	 of	 probabilities.	 This	 assumption,	which	in	a	sense	can	indeed	be	read	in	Hume’s	text,	is	actually	incorrect.	It	leads	to	a	dilemma	(explained	in	Section	4)	and	the	way	out	is	to	realize	that	the	assumption	violates	the	probability	calculus	(Section	5).	 In	Section	6	we	explain	what	happens	after	we	have	reconstructed	the	regress	argument	in	a	way	that	does	agree	with	the	calculus,	 i.e.	 by	 means	 of	 a	 sum	 of	 products	 rather	 than	 a	 single	 product	 of	probabilities.	 We	 show	 that	 then	 there	 is	 indeed	 something	 that	 diminishes	 and	finally	 fades	 away,	 but	 it	 is	 something	 other	 than	what	 Hume	 presumably	 had	 in	mind.	 Thus,	 as	 we	 explain	 in	 Section	 7,	 two	 different	 views	 emerge	 as	 to	 what	exactly	 it	 is	 that	diminishes	 in	the	 iterative	probability	argument.	We	surmise	that	Hume	 failed	 to	 differentiate	 between	 them,	 since	 he	 lacked	 the	 means	 to	discriminate	between	two	formalizations	of	his	argument,	one	that	is	in	accordance	with	the	probability	calculus	and	one	that	is	not.	This	may	have	contributed	to	the	many	confusions	surrounding	Treatise	1.4.1.				
2.	Probability	reduces	to	nothing		Here	is	Hume’s	regress	argument	as	it	appears	in	1.4.1:		 “In	every	 judgment	…	we	ought	always	to	correct	the	first	 judgment,	derived	 from	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 object,	 by	 another	 judgment,	 deriv’d	from	the	nature	of	the	understanding.	…	As	demonstration	is	subject	to	 the	 controul	 of	 probability,	 so	 is	 probability	 liable	 to	 a	 new	correction	 by	 a	 reflex	 act	 of	 the	 mind,	 wherein	 the	 nature	 of	 our	understanding,	and	our	reasoning	from	the	first	probability,	 	become	our	objects.	(T	1.4.1.5)		 	 Having	 thus	 found	 in	 every	 probability,	 beside	 the	 original	uncertainty	 inherent	 in	 the	 subject,	 a	 new	 uncertainty	 deriv’d	 from	the	weakness	of	that	faculty,	which	judges,	and	having	adjusted	these																																																									10	Richard	Price	had	convinced	Hume	that	some	part	of	Hume’s	reasoning	was	 inconclusive	(Peach	1980).	We	are	not	sure	which	part	this	is,	but	Price	explicitly	criticizes	Hume’s	regress	argument	in	A	
Review	of	the	Principal	Questions	in	Morals,	incidentally	without	using	formal	tools.	Since	the	regress	argument	 in	1.4.1	 is	among	 the	arguments	 from	the	Treatise	 that	are	not	 repeated	 in	Hume’s	 later	writings,	 David	 Raynor	 has	 suggested	 that	 Price,	 perhaps	 in	 early	 conversations,	 convinced	Hume	that	this	piece	of	reasoning	is	incorrect	(Raynor	1981).	
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two	together,	we	are	oblig’d	by	our	reason	to	add	a	new	doubt	deriv’d	from	 the	possibility	 of	 error	 in	 the	 estimation	we	make	of	 the	 truth	and	fidelity	of	our	faculties.	This	is	a	doubt,	which	immediately	occurs	to	us,	and	of	which,	if	we	wou’d	closely	pursue	our	reason,	we	cannot	avoid	giving	a	decision.	But	this	decision,	tho’	it	should	be	favourable	to	our	preceding	 judgment,	 being	 founded	only	on	probability,	must	weaken	still	further	our	first	evidence,	and	must	itself	be	weaken’d	by	a	fourth	doubt	of	the	same	kind,	and	so	on	in	infinitum;	till	at	last	there	remain	 nothing	 of	 the	 original	 probability,	 however	 great	 we	 may	suppose	it	to	have	been,	and	however	small	the	diminution	by	every	new	 uncertainty.	 	 No	 finite	 object	 can	 subsist	 under	 a	 decrease	repeated	 in	infinitum;	and	even	the	vastest	quantity,	which	can	enter	human	 imagination,	must	 in	 this	manner	 be	 reduc’d	 to	 nothing.”	 (T	1.4.1.6)		At	 first	 sight	 the	 argument	 might	 seem	 perfectly	 reasonable:	 doubting	 the	probability	you	attach	to	a	proposition,	and	then	casting	doubt	on	your	doubt,	and	so	 on,	 would	 appear	 to	 diminish	 the	 probability	 with	 which	 you	 believed	 the	proposition	 in	 the	 first	place.	Nevertheless	something	odd	appears	 to	be	going	on,	although	it	is	unclear	what	exactly	it	is.	Thus	many	scholars	have	railed	against	the	argument,	but	few	made	clear	what	is	formally	wrong	with	it.11		 In	 order	 to	 see	 what	 exactly	 is	 wrong	 with	 the	 argument,	 we	 will	 first	 in	Section	3	concentrate	on	a	particular	example.	In	line	with	Hume’s	text,	this	example	is	taken	from	the	“demonstrative	sciences”	(T	1.4.1.1)	and	we	shall	analyze	it	in	the	standard	 formalist	manner	of	Von	Wright,	Quine,	Popkin	and	others.	As	 intimated	above,	this	analysis	in	fact	contains	a	fundamental	formal	mistake	that,	remarkably	enough,	was	not	noted	by	any	of	the	formalists.	The	mistake	involves	the	erroneous	use	of	a	product	of	probabilities,	but	a	full	explanation	of	it	will	be	postponed	until	Section	5.	We	therefore	ask	the	attentive	reader	to	patiently	bear	with	us	as	we	go	through	 the	 standard	 formalist	 reconstruction	 of	 Hume’s	 argument,	 and	 not	 be	perturbed	by	an	occasional	offending	formula.			
3.	The	standard	formalist	approach		Imagine	Maurice,	a	mathematician	who	has	just	performed	the	laborious	addition	of	the	 first	 1000	 natural	 numbers:	 S=1+2+3+	 .	 .	 .	 +1000	 by	 hand.	 Maurice	 has	concluded		that		
A:	The	sum	S	is	equal	to	500500.																																																									
11	David	Stove	famously	commented	“the	argument	 is	generally	recognized	as	being	the	worst	ever	conceived	by	a	man	of	genius”,	without	actually	pointing	to	a	formal	mistake	(Stove	1965,	174,	note	12).	Mikael	Karlsson	simply	called	the	argument	“a	morass”	(Karlsson	1990,	126),	 thereby	echoing	Fogelin’s	words	(Fogelin	1985,	16).	
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	Although	A	is	correct,	Maurice	can	never	be	entirely	sure	of	that	—	there	is	always	the	possibility	 that	he	made	a	mistake.	Or	as	Hume	puts	 it,	 “[i]n	all	demonstrative	sciences,	 the	 rules	 are	 certain	 and	 infallible;	 but	when	we	 apply	 them	our	 fallible	and	 uncertain	 faculties	 are	 very	 apt	 to	 depart	 from	 them,	 and	 fall	 into	 error”	(1.4.1.1).	Maurice,	realizing	that	his	application	of	the	“certain	and	infallible”	rules	is	prone	to	error,	can	therefore	only	conclude	with	a	certain	probability	that	A	is	true	(T	1.4.1.1).	Of	course,	if	his	colleagues	independently	arrive	at	the	same	result,	then	he	may	become	more	confident	 that	he	applied	the	rules	correctly	(T	1.4.1.2).	The	salient	point	however	is	that	he	can	never	be	certain	that	he	has	not	made	a	mistake:	the	 scepticism	 described	 in	 1.4.1	 is	 aimed	 at	 our	 credence	 in	 mathematical	statements	like	A,	not	at	the	statements	themselves.		 Let	us	suppose	that	Maurice	trusts	his	calculational	ability	to	at	least	75%.	In	other	words,	he	believes:			
B:	The	probability	that	A	is	true	is	at	least	¾, 	where	 'the	probability'	means	Maurice's	credence.	Of	course,	even	if	B	 is	true,	that	does	 not	 guarantee	 that	Maurice’s	 calculation	 of	 S	was	 correct.	We	will	write	 the	conditional	probability	that	A	is	true,	on	the	assumption	that	B	is	true,	as		 P1(A|B),			where	 the	superscript	 ‘1’	 indicates	a	 first-order	probability.12	Maurice	has	no	 idea	what	 the	 precise	 value	 of	 this	 conditional	 probability	 is,	 but	 he	 does	 believe	(because	he	believes	B)	that	it	must	lie	in	the	interval	between	¾	and	1.	If	Maurice	had	a	full	belief	in	B,	his	estimate	of	the	unconditional	probability	of	B	would	have	been	one,		i.e.	P1(B)=	1.	In	that	case			 	 	 P1(A)	=	P1(A|B)P1(B)		 	 	 	 	 (1)		would	boil	down	to	P1(A)	=	P1(A|B).	For	the	purposes	of	the	exposition	we	assume	the	 latter	 probability	 to	 have	 some	 definite	 value	 in	 the	 interval	 [¾,	 1];	 this	assumption	is	however	not	necessary	as	the	argument	also	works	when	imprecise	values	are	used	(cf.	footnote	31).	However,	 Maurice	 does	 not	 believe	 B	 in	 full.	 Following	 Hume	 1.4.1.6,	 he	entertains	second-order	worries	about	his	first-order	judgement:	he	doubts	that	B	is																																																									12	 Strictly	 speaking,	 we	 are	 here	 dealing	 with	 a	 second-order	 probability	 (since	 B	 itself	 already	contains	 the	word	 ‘probability’),	but	 for	convenience	we	use	P1	and	call	 it	a	 first-order	probability.	Recall	that	all	the	probabilities	are	credences.	In	particular,	it	is	not	the	case	that	A	has	an	objective	chance,	and	that	Maurice	has	a	degree	of	belief	in	that	chance.	After	all,	A	is	a	mathematical	statement	and	is	thus	either	true	or	false;	it	does	not	make	sense	to	attach	an	objective	chance	to	A.	However,	it	does	make	sense	to	say	that	Maurice	has	a	particular	credence	 in	A’s	 truth.	This	does	not	mean,	as	one	reviewer	thought,	that	Maurice	“is	unsure	about	his	own	state	of	mind”.	Maurice	knows	what	he	thinks	(he	knows	the	contents	of	his	thoughts),	he	just	does	not	know	whether	what	he	thinks	is	true.	The	regress	is	about	degrees	of	belief,	not	about	contents	of	belief.	
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true.13	Let	us	suppose	that	Maurice’s	belief	in	B	also	ranges	between	¾	and	1,	so	he	believes:			
C:	The	probability	that	B	is	true	is	at	least	¾,		where	again	'probability'	means	Maurice's	credence.14	If	Maurice	had	a	full	belief	in	
C,	his	estimate	of	the	unconditional	probability	of	would	have	been	one:	P2(C)	=	1,	where	the	superscript	‘2’	indicates	a	probability	of	the	second	order.	In	that	case			 	 	 P2(B)	=	P2(B|C)P2(C)	 	 	 	 	 	 (2)		would	simplify	to	P2(B)	=	P2(B|C).	Following	Hume’s	lead,	Maurice	now	has	to	revise	his	estimate	of	the	probability	that	the	sum	S	is	equal	to	500500	as	follows:		 	 	 P2(A)	=	P2(A|B)P2(B)	=	P2(A|B)P2(B|C).	 	 	 (3)		Thus	Maurice’s	credence	in	A	has	been	reduced	from	the	first-order	value	(1)	to	the	second-order	value	(3).15		 This	reasoning	is	based	on	the	assumption	that	Maurice	fully	believes	C,	but	of	course	he	does	not.	He	has	doubts	about	C,	and	in	fact	believes:		
D:	The	probability	that	C	is	true	is	at	least	¾.		If	he	had	a	full	belief	 in	D,	so	that	P3(D)	=	1,	then	according	to	the	same	reasoning	P3(C)	=	P3(C|D),	so	that	P3(B)	=	P3(B|C)P3(C|D),	and	finally				 	 P3(A)	=	P3(A|B)P3(B|C)P3(C|D).	 	 	 	 	 (4)		But	the	fact	is	that	he	does	not	fully	believe	D,	and	so	on.	It	is	evident	that,	after	an	infinite	number	of	doubtings,	the	indefinitely	revised	probability	that	his	calculation	is	correct	is		
	 	 P*(A)	=	P*(A|B)	P*(B|C)	P*(C|D)	P*(D|E)	....	 	 	 	 (5)		where	P*	is	the	limit	of	Pn	as	n	goes	to	infinity,	and	it	represents	Maurice’s	definitive	credence	in	A.	Since	(5)	confronts	us	with	an	infinite	product	of	factors	all	less	than	one,	it	is	claimed	that	this	yields	zero	for	P*(A):	the	belief	in	A	has	been	“reduc’d	to	nothing”,	 as	 Hume	 puts	 it.	 Or	 in	 the	words	 of	 Richard	 Popkin,	 which	 capture	 the																																																									13	 That	 Hume’s	 argument	 involved	 second-order	 probabilities	 is	 acknowledged	 not	 only	 by	formalists,	but	also	by	scholars	who	shun	a	formal	approach.	See	for	example	Garrett,	2015,	224	and	236.	14	Had	Maurice's	credence	been	exactly	(rather	than	at	least)	¾,	then	his	second-order	credence	that	his	first-order	credence	was	¾	would	have	been	0	(since	the	measure	of	a	point	is	zero),	and	there	would	then	have	been	no	chain	of	Humean	doubtings.	15	Maurice’s	move	here	is	actually	incorrect,	as	are	his	subsequent	moves;	as	we	intimated,	we	shall	address	these	mistakes	in	Section	5.	
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formalists’	position	well:	“Since	[the]	probabilities	are	smaller	than	1,	the	product	is	smaller	than	either	of	them.	…	This	process	of	introducing	new	probabilities	…	can	go	on	ad	infinitum,	and	thus,	the	probability	that	we	could	ever	recognize	…	that	a	particular	piece	of	reasoning	was	correct,	approached	to	zero.”16	
	
	
4.	A	dilemma		The	above	standard	formalists’	reconstruction	of	Hume’s	regress	argument	has	been	criticized	in	two	different	ways	(neither	of	which	coincides	with	our	criticism,	as	we	will	 see	 in	 the	 next	 section).	 First,	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 the	 reconstruction,	although	presenting	us	with	a	valid	argument,	does	not	reflect	the	actual	argument	which	Hume	was	making.	Second,	it	has	been	claimed	that	the	reconstruction	does	reflect	Hume’s	 actual	 argument,	 but	 shows	 that	 this	 argument	 is	 invalid.	 The	 first	line	of	criticism	is	favoured	by	anti-formalists,	the	second	by	formalists.		 David	 Owen	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 representative	 of	 the	 first	 group.	 In	 a	 very	interesting	 chapter	 on	 Treatise	 1.4.1,	 he	 argues	 that	 Hume’s	 regress	 argument	cannot	 be	 interpreted	 as	 “the	 apparent	mathematical	 truism	 that	 a	 probability	 of	less	 than	one	will	continually	decrease	as	 it	 is	successively	multiplied	by	numbers	less	 than	 one”.17	 He	 points	 out	 that	 such	 an	 interpretation	 has	 unHumean	consequences,	for	if	“we	end	up	…	believing	p	with	zero	probability”,	then	we	would	“have	a	belief	with	probability	one	in	not-p”.	Owen	remarks	that	this	 is	clearly	not	what	 Hume	 intended	 and	 concludes:	 “The	 point	 of	 Hume’s	 argument	 is	 ‘the	 total	extinction	of	belief	and	evidence’	…	It	is	a	sceptical	argument,	not	the	argument	of	a	negative	dogmatist.”18			 By	calling	the	argument	that	comes	out	of	the	reconstruction	a	“mathematical	truism”,	 Owen	 implies	 that	 it	 is	 valid.	 But	 in	 fact	 it	 is	 not.	 Simple	 as	 a	 successive	multiplication	of	numbers	 less	 than	one	may	be,	 it	 is	not	 a	 “mathematical	 truism”	that	 it	 always	 yields	 zero.	 This	 takes	 us	 to	 the	 second	 way	 in	 which	 the	reconstruction	in	the	previous	section	has	been	criticized.		Although	usually	it	is	true	that	a	product	of	factors	all	less	than	one	tends	to	zero	in	the	limit,	this	is	not	always	the	case.	Quite	a	few	formalists	commenting	on	the	regress	argument	in	1.4.1	have	noticed	this.	They	draw	attention	to	the	fact	that	a	product	such	as	(5)	can	converge	to	a	non-zero	number,	and	they	criticise	Hume	for	failing	to	see	this.	An	early	such	formal	 author	was	Charles	 Sanders	Peirce.19	Another	one	was	Willard	Van	Orman	
																																																								16	 Popkin	 1951,	 390.	 Popkin	 seems	 to	 have	 had	 a	 simpler	 version	 of	 (5)	 in	 mind,	 namely	 one	involving	a	product	of	unconditional	probabilities	rather	than	conditional	ones:	P(A)P(B)P(C)P(D)	….	For	 the	 purposes	 of	 our	 paper	 the	 distinction	 between	 (5)	 and	 this	 simpler	 version	 is	 irrelevant.	Other	authors	who	argued	in	this	vein	are	Peirce	1905;	Von	Wright	1941,	153,	cf.	p.	223;	Quine	1946,	50-51;	Wilson	1983,	123;	DeWitt	1985,	130;	Fogelin	1985,	16.	That	 is	not	not	 to	 say	 that	all	 these	writers	use	formula	(5),	but	their	reasoning	is	in	accordance	with	assuming	something	like	(5).		17	Owen	2015,	114.	18	Owen	2015,	114.	Cf.	Owen	1999,	Chapter	8;	Ainslie	2015,	21-22.	19	 Pollock	 and	 Agler	 2015.	 These	 authors	 quote	 Peirce	 on	 the	 matter	 and	 give	 references	 to	 the	relevant	papers.		
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Quine,	 who	 gives	 an	 abstruse	 example.20	 Simpler	 cases	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Richard	DeWitt.21	The	fact	is	also	stressed	by	Richard	Fogelin	in	early	work.22	Peirce,	Quine,	DeWitt	and	Fogelin	all	are	right	to	observe	that	sometimes	(5)	can	 converge	 to	 a	 non-zero	 number.	 Yet	 their	 observation	 is	 beside	 the	 point.	 In	stressing	that	 the	product	 in	(5)	might	not	be	equal	 to	zero,	 the	authors	refer	to	a	very	 special	 case,	 one	 that	 only	 occurs	 under	 exceptional	 circumstances	 (a	necessary	 condition	 for	 this	 special	 case	 to	 occur	 is	 that	 the	 higher	 probability	factors	should	get	increasingly	closer	to	one,	and	there	is	no	indication	whatsoever	that	Hume	had	this	condition	in	mind).	Moreover,	their	observation	ignores	what	is	at	the	heart	of	Hume’s	argument.	Whatever	exactly	Hume	is	trying	to	express	in	his	iterative	probability	argument,	he	is	emphasizing	that	a	continual	diminution	takes	place.	There	is	something	that,	in	the	end,	becomes	nothing	at	all.	To	point	out	that	a	product	may	converge	to	a	positive	number	and	leave	it	at	that	may	be	too	simple.23		 We	now	find	ourselves	beset	by	a	dilemma.	If	we	follow	Owen	and	some	of	his	fellow	anti-formalists,	then	we	must	assume	that	Hume	cannot	have	meant	that	(5)	 yields	 zero,	 for	 this	 would	 have	 turned	 his	 argument	 into	 that	 of	 a	 negative	dogmatist.24	 But	 assuming	with	 formalists	 like	 Peirce	 and	 Quine	 that	 (5)	 yields	 a	number	 other	 than	 zero	 leaves	 it	 unclear	 why	 Hume	 writes	 that	 “at	 last	 there	remain	nothing”	of	the	original	probability,	P(A).		 A	possible	reaction	to	this	dilemma	is	to	blame	the	formal	approach,	and	to	conclude	that	the	probability	calculus	simply	is	inappropriate	for	evaluating	Hume’s	argument.	Such	a	conclusion	has	indeed	be	drawn	by	several	Hume	scholars.	David	Owen,	Don	Garrett,	Barry	Gower,	Annette	Baier,	Antonia	Lolordo,	to	mention	only	a	few,	 have	 all	 more	 or	 less	 explicitly	 advocated	 a	 non-formal	 reading	 of	 Hume’s	argument.	In	the	current	case,	however,	we	think	that	the	use	of	formal	tools	is	not	out	of	place.	First,	since	Hume	talks	about	probabilities	and	their	continual	decrease,	invoking	probability	theory	seems	not	unnatural	 if	we	aim	to	assess	what	he	says.	Second	 and	more	 importantly,	 the	 rejection	 of	 all	 formal	 tools	 when	 it	 comes	 to	evaluating	the	regress	argument	in	1.4.1	deprives	us	of	a	worthwhile	instrument	to	make	 sense	 of	 a	 key	 concept	 in	 the	 argument,	 namely	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 continuous	diminution	 culminating	 in	 nought.	 As	 we	 will	 explain	 in	 Section	 6,	 a	 correct	application	of	probability	theory	makes	it	clear	that	indeed	there	is	something	that																																																									20	Quine	1946/2008,	50-51.	Thanks	to	Sander	Verhaegh	for	drawing	our	attention	to	Quine’s	lectures	on	Hume,	which	paved	the	way	for	this	paper.	21	DeWitt	1985,	131.	22	Fogelin	1985,	174,	note	4.	Later,	however,	Fogelin	moves	away	from	his	criticism:	“That	criticism,	though	fair	enough,	now	strikes	me	as	shallow	in	conceding	too	much	to	Hume’s	argument.”	(Fogelin	2009,	54,	note	4).	23	Richard	DeWitt	 remarks	 that,	 if	 one	prohibits	 the	 higher	 factors	 from	exceeding	 some	 arbitrary	value	 very	 close	 to	 one,	 say	 0.999999,	 then	 Hume’s	 assertion	 about	 the	 vanishing	 of	 all	 infinite	products	 is	 correct	 (DeWitt	 1985,	 132).	 Fogelin	makes	 an	 equivalent	point	when	he	observes	 that	Hume	could	rescue	his	claim	by	saying	“that	there	is	some	finite	degree	or	probability	below	which	the	chance	or	error	can	never	 fall”	 (Fogelin	2009,	17).	DeWitt	and	Fogelin	are	correct,	but,	as	 they	acknowledge	themselves,	the	cases	they	describe	are	even	more	exceptional,	and	therefore	ill-suited	as	reconstructions	of	what	Hume	may	have	meant.	24	Unless,	of	course,	Hume	did	not	realize	that	"believing	p	with	zero	probability"	implies	"having	a	belief	with	probability	one	in	not-p".	Owen	does	not	seem	to	consider	this	possibility.	
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is	 “reduc’d	 to	 nothing”;	 it	 is	 just	 that	what	 is	 annihilated	 is	 something	 other	 than	what	has	to	date	been	thought.	But	first,	in	Section	5,	we	show	why	the	formulas	(3)	to	(5),	intuitive	as	they	perhaps	may	seem,	are	actually	incorrect.				
5.	A	sum	rather	than	a	multiplication	
	Consider	 again	 the	 example	 of	 the	 addition	 of	 the	 first	 1000	 natural	 numbers:	S=1+2+3+	.	 .	 .	+1000.	We	argued	Section	3	that	the	first-order	probability	that	A	 is	true	 is	 P1(A)	 =	 P1(A|B)P1(B).	 However,	 this	 reasoning	 ignores	 an	 important	possibility	that	must	be	taken	into	account	when	determining	the	probability	that	A	is	true.	This	is	the	possibility	that	A	is	true,	even	if	B	is	false,	that	is,	even	if	it	is	not	true	 that	 the	 probability	 that	 all	 the	 intermediate	 calculations	 were	 correct	 is	 at	least	¾.	After	all,	Maurice	might	have	made	 two	mistakes	 that	 cancel	one	another	out,	 or	 committed	 some	 other	 fortuitous	 blunder	 that	 does	 not	 change	 the	 final	answer.	Indeed,	he	might	be	so	prone	to	such	errors	that	the	probability	that	all	his	calculations	were	correct	is	less	than	¾,	even	though	the	result	actually	turns	out	to	be	 the	 right	 answer.	 We	 symbolize	 this	 situation	 by	 the	 conditional	 probability	P1(A|¬B),	which	in	general	will	not	be	zero.	The	correct	expression	for	P1(A)	is	not	(1)	but	rather		
	 	 P1(A)		=		P1(A|B)	P1(B)		+		P1(A|¬B)	P1(¬B),		 	 	 (1’)		where	 a	 second	 term	 has	 been	 added;	 (1’)	 is	 an	 instantiation	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 total	probability.	Now	if	P1(B)	is	equal	to	one,	P1(¬B)	is	zero,	and	then	the	second	term	in	(1’)	makes	no	numerical	contribution;	in	that	case	P1(A)	=	P1(A|B),	as	in	(1),	which	‘fortuitously’	gives	the	correct	answer	for	P1(A).	This	luck	will	not	persist	in	higher	orders	of	Humean	doubt,	however,	as	we	will	see.			 At	 the	 second	order	of	doubting,	we	again	use	 the	 rule	of	 total	probability,	writing	P2(A)	=	P2(A|B)	P2(B)	+	P2(A|¬B)	P2(¬B),	and		instead	of	(2)	we	write		
	 	 P2(B)	=	P2(B|C)	P2(C)	+		P2(B|¬C)	P2(¬C).	 	 	 	 (2’)		If	P2(C)	=	1,	this	reduces	to	P2(B)	=	P2(B|C),	but	then	P2(¬B)	=	1	−	P2(B|C),	which	is	not	zero.	Therefore	the	second	term,	P2(A|¬B)	P2(¬B),	in	the	expression	for	P2(A)	is	not	 zero,	 and	 (3)	 is	 definitely	 incorrect.	 No	 luck	 at	 this	 level	 of	 doubt,	 nor	 at	 any	higher	levels!			 What	 happens	 if	 we	 repeat	 these	 transformations,	 in	 particular	 infinitely	many	 times?	 In	 fact	 it	 can	 be	 proven	 that	 an	 infinite	 iteration	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 total	probability	usually	converges,	not	to	zero,	but	to	a	unique	and	well-defined	number	between	 one	 and	 zero.25	 Which	 number	 that	 is	 depends	 on	 the	 values	 of	 the																																																									25	 For	 a	 general	 proof,	 see	 Atkinson	 and	 Peijnenburg	 2017,	 pp.	 194-195.	 A	 simpler	 version	 of	 the	proof,	applying	to	the	uniform	case	only,	goes	as	follows.	P*(An)	=	β	+	γ	P*(An+1),	where	A0	stands	for	
A,	A1	 for	B,	A2	 for	C,	and	so	on.	Here	γ	=	α	−	β	where	α	and	β	are	 the	 two	conditional	probabilities,	assumed	 to	 be	 the	 same	 from	 step	 to	 step	 (the	 uniformity	 assumption).	 By	 iterating	 this	 rule	 one	
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probabilities	 in	 the	 chain.	We	will	not	 stop	 to	give	 the	proof	here,	 all	 the	more	 so	since	we	do	not	have	to	work	out	the	details	 in	order	to	see	that	P*(A)	is	not	zero:	this	 outcome	 can	 already	 be	 grasped	 without	 exhaustive	 calculations	 as	 follows.	 Rather	than	saying	that	P*(A)	 is	a	function	of	an	infinite	sequence	of	doubts	(where	we	take	into	account	that	these	doubts	may	be	well	or	ill	founded),	we	could	also	 say	 that	 P*(A)	 is	 determined	 by	 P*(B),	 and	 that	 P*(B)	 rather	 than	 P*(A)	 is	 a	function	of	an	infinite	sequence	of	doubts.	Now	whatever	the	value	of	P*(B)	is,	it	is	a	probability	value,	so	it	must	be	a	number	between	zero	and	one.	Let	us	first	consider	these	two	extreme	cases:	if	P*(B)	=	1,	so	that	P*(¬B)	=	0,	then	P*(A)		=		P*(A|B);	but	if	P*(B)	=	0,	then	P*(¬B)	=	1,	and	in	that	case	P*(A)	=	P*(A|¬B).	Whatever	the	value	of	P*(B)	 is,	 P*(A)	 must	 lie	 between	 P*(A|B)	 and	 P*(A|¬B).26	 If	 neither	 of	 these	 two	conditional	probabilities	is	zero,	P*(A)	cannot	be	zero.			 The	conclusion	therefore	is	that	P*(A)	is	not	zero,	no	matter	what	the	infinite	sequence	of	higher	and	higher-order	corrections	to	P*(B)	might	be.	We	have	arrived	at	 this	 conclusion	 without	 the	 exceptional	 measures	 that	 formalists	 like	 Peirce,	Quine,	 DeWitt	 and	 others	 saw	 fit	 to	 take.	 They	 have	 criticized	 Hume’s	 regress	argument	not	because	 it	 lacks	a	second	term	and	thereby	violates	 the	rule	of	 total	probability,	but	because	in	exceptional	cases	formula	(5)	is	not	equal	to	zero.	Even	though	 the	 latter	 is	 true,	 as	 a	 criticism	of	Hume	 it	 is	beside	 the	point,	 as	we	have	seen.27		 However,	 if	 P*(A)	 is	 not	 equal	 to	 zero,	 what	 to	 do	 with	 the	 “continual	diminution”	 that	 Hume	 is	 talking	 about?	 Is	 there	 something	 that	 is	 “reduc’d	 to	nothing”	in	the	long	run?	In	Section	6	we	explain	that	there	is,	but	that	it	is	different	from	what	Hume	(at	least	in	the	opinion	of	most	interpretors)	had	in	mind.				
6.	The	contribution	diminishes		Consider	again	how	Hume	words	his	regress	argument:																																																																																																																																																																							finds	that	P*(A0)	=	β	+β	γ	+	β	γ2	+…+	β	γn	+	γn+1	P*(An+1).	Since	|	γ	|	<	1	and	P*(An+1)	<1,	it	follows	that	the	infinite	series	is	convergent,	and	that	P*(A0)	 	 is	 in	fact	equal	to	β	 times	a	geometric	series,	with	the	value	β	/	(1−	γ).	26	Since	P*(A)	is	a	linear,	and	a	fortiori	a	monotone	function	of	P*(B).	27	The	formalists’	focus	on	the	fact	that	(5)	does	not	always	yield	zero	might	explain	why	they	did	not	see	 that	 (5)	 is	 actually	 invalid.	 That	 is,	 they	 noticed	 that	 Hume	was	 presumably	 thinking	 of	 some	multiplication	like	(5),	but	rather	than	realizing	that	(5)	is	the	wrong	formula,	they	pointed	out	that	an	infinite	product	of	factors	all	less	than	one	can	be	positive.	Another	explanation	of	why	formalists	failed	 to	see	 that	we	are	actually	dealing	with	a	sum	rather	 than	a	product,	 is	 that	 the	rule	of	 total	probability	may	have	been	less	obvious	than	it	is	today.	Note	that	the	formalists	published	their	work	several	 decades	 ago,	when	probability	 theory	was	not	 so	widely	 used	 in	 philosophy	 as	 it	 is	 today.	Also,	even	philosophers	like	Bertrand	Russell	sometimes	forgot	about	the	rule	of	total	probability;	cf.	his	mistake	in	Human	Knowledge.	Its	Scope	and	Limits	of	1948,	which	was	pointed	out	to	him	by	Hans	Reichenbach	 in	 a	 letter	 of	March	 28,	 1949	 (Reichenbach	 and	 Cohen	 1978,	 405-411).	 In	 a	 reply	 to	Reichenbach	 on	 April	 22,	 1949,	 Russell	 acknowledged	 the	 error.	 In	 daily	 reasoning	 the	 error	 also	occurs,	 and	 may	 be	 connected	 to	 the	 confirmation	 bias	 fallacy	 (thanks	 to	 Ulrike	 Hahn	 for	 this	suggestion);	however,	as	far	as	we	know	no	research	has	been	done	on	this	matter.	
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“Let	 our	 first	 belief	 be	 never	 so	 strong,	 it	 must	 infallibly	 perish	 by	passing	 thro’	 so	 many	 examinations,	 of	 which	 each	 diminishes	somewhat	 of	 its	 force	 and	 vigour.	 When	 I	 reflect	 on	 the	 natural	fallibility	of	my	judgment,	I	have	less	confidence	in	my	opinions,	than	when	 I	 only	 consider	 the	 objects	 concerning	 which	 I	 reason.”	 (T	1.4.1.6)			If	the	chain	is	infinite,		 “all	the	rules	of	logic	require	a	continual	diminution,	and	at	last	a	total	extinction	of	belief	and	evidence.”	(ibid.)		We	have	 seen	 that	 it	 is	problematic	 to	 interpret	 this	 as	 entailing	 that	our	original	belief	in	a	proposition	indefinitely	diminishes	as	the	chain	of	probability	judgements	over	 probability	 judgements	 lengthens.	 That	 is,	 P*(A)	 is	 not	 simply	 a	 product	 of	terms	like	those	in	Section	2,	but	is	a	sum	of	terms,	each	of	which	is	positive.	Then	what	is	it	that	decreases?			 Kevin	Meeker	has	suggested	that	it	is	the	epistemic	justification	of	the	belief.	In	his	view,	 the	original	belief	 in	a	proposition	becomes	 less	and	 less	 likely,	 in	 the	sense	 that	 its	 justification	 reduces	 as	 the	 chain	 gets	 longer.	 If	 one	 assumes,	 as	Meeker	says	most	epistemologists	do,	that	justification	is	necessary	for	knowledge,	then	“Hume’s	argument	reveals	that	we	lack	knowledge	because	all	our	beliefs	lack	justification”.28	David	Owen	and	Don	Garrett	have	contested	this	view.	According	to	them	it	 is	the	retention	of	the	belief	that	 is	at	stake.	As	the	chain	lengthens,	beliefs	will	cease	to	be	beliefs	and	turn	into	sterile	ideas	without	any	force	or	vivacity:		 “The	 point	 is	 not	 that	 a	 belief,	 with	 full	 force	 and	 vigor,	 is	 seen	 to	 be	unjustified;	rather,	it	is	that	because	the	force	and	vigor	continually	decrease,	the	idea	seems	in	danger	of	ceasing	to	be	a	belief	at	all.”	29		And:		 “When	Hume	worries	about	 ‘a	 total	extinction	of	belief	and	evidence’	…,	 the	concern	 is	 not	 justification,	 but	 quite	 literally	 the	 extinction	 of	 belief.	 …	Hume’s	concern	here	is	the	retention,	not	the	justification,	of	belief”.30		Both	 camps,	 dissimilar	 as	 they	 may	 be,	 concur	 in	 assuming	 that	 the	 diminution	refers	 to	properties	of	 the	original	belief.	According	to	Meeker,	what	weakens	and	finally	 dies	 out	 is	 the	 justification	 of	 the	 original	 belief.	 According	 to	 Owen	 and	Garrett,	 it	 is	 the	belief’s	 force	and	vigour	 that	decreases,	putting	 the	 retention	and	ultimately	the	very	existence	of	the	original	belief	at	risk.		
																																																								28	Meeker	2000,	228;	cf.	Meeker	1998	and	Meeker	2013.	29	Owen	2015,	113.		30	Owen	2015,	116.	Ibid.,	120.	See	also	Owen	1999,	Chapter	8,	and	Garrett	1997.	
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	 However	neither	Meeker’s	view	nor	that	of	Owen	and	Garrett	sits	well	with	the	observations	 that	we	made	above	on	 the	basis	 of	 the	 rule	of	 total	 probability.	There	 we	 saw	 that	 P*(A),	 supported	 by	 an	 infinite	 chain,	 can	 take	 on	 any	 value	between	 one	 and	 zero,	 including	 quite	 a	 large	 one.	 But	 if	 the	 probability	 of	 A	converges	to	a	value	that	is	large,	then	it	seems	strange	to	say	that	the	justification	of	the	belief	in	A	decreases	or	that	the	force	with	which	A	is	believed	weakens	until	it	dies	out	completely.			 We	have	seen	 that	some	authors	solve	 this	problem	by	eschewing	a	 formal	reading	 of	 the	 text	 altogether.	 We	 think	 there	 is	 no	 need	 to	 do	 so.	 For	 once	 the	correct	 formalism	 is	 in	 place,	 including	 the	 second	 term,	 it	 becomes	 clear	 that	indeed	 something	 dwindles	 away	 to	 nothing	 as	 the	 chain	 gets	 longer	 and	 longer.	However	it	is	neither	the	justification	nor	the	force	of	the	belief	in	A.	Rather,	it	is	the	
contribution	 of	 the	 successive	 links	 in	 the	 chain	 to	 the	 value	of	P*(A),	which	 itself	may	very	well	be	high.	In	order	to	understand	this,	let	us	go	back	to	our	example.			 At	the	nth	order	of	doubting,	the	probability	that	S	=	500500	can	be	written	as		
	 	 Pn(A)		=		Pn(A|B)	Pn(B)		+		Pn(A|¬B)	Pn(¬B),			 	 	 (1’’)		where	 Pn(A|B)	 is	 the	 nth-order	 probability	 that	 S	 =	 500500,	 given	 that	 the	probability	that	Maurice’s	calculations	were	correct	is	at	least		¾.	Let	us	suppose,	as	an	illustration,	that	this	conditional	probability	is	0.9.31	The	conditional	probability	Pn(A|¬B)	 is	 the	probability	 that	S	=	500500,	 if	 the	probability	 that	his	 calculations	were	correct	is	less	than	¾.	This	conditional	probability	will	be	lower	than	Pn(A|B),	but	 it	will	 generally	not	be	 zero.	 Let	us	 suppose	 this	 conditional	probability	 to	be	0.5.32	Thus	(1’’)	becomes 	
	 	 Pn(A)		=		0.9	Pn(B)		+		0.5	Pn(¬B).	 		 	 	 	 (6)		Had	Maurice	been	sure	that	B	is	true,	then	P1(B)	would	have	been	equal	to	unity,	and	P1(A)	would	 have	 been	 0.9.	 However,	 he	 has	 doubts	 about	 the	 veracity	 of	B,	 and	calculates		
	 	 P2(B)		=		P2(B|C)	P2(C)		+		P2(B|¬C)	P2(¬C),	 	 	 	 (2’)		under	the	assumption	that	P2(C)	is	one.	For	the	sake	of	our	illustration,	we	suppose	that	 the	 conditional	 probabilities	 in	 (2’)	 are	 the	 same	 as	 those	 in	 (6)	—	 but	 see	footnote	32.	Thus	(2’)	becomes																																																										31	 Attaching	 a	 precise	 numerical	 value	 to	 this	 conditional	 probability	 raises	 of	 course	 various	philosophical	problems,	but	this	is	done	purely	for	illustrative	purposes.	Our	argument	can	be	easily	extended	to	the	case	where	intervals,	rather	than	precise	values,	are	assumed.	32	The	numbers	0.9	and	0.5	only	serve	as	examples.	We	could	have	chosen	pretty	well	any	numbers	for	the	conditional	probabilities,	since	our	argument	is	insensitive	to	the	values	that	are	selected.	In	particular	it	is	not	essential	that	all	the	conditional	probabilities	in	the	chain	have	the	same	value:	our	argument	also	works	if	the	numbers	are	not	uniform	from	link	to	link.	Note	that,	given	the	meaning	of	
B,	C,	etc.,	we	would	expect	that	Pn(A|B)	etc.	are	greater	than	¾,	and	that	Pn(A|¬B)	etc.	are	less	than	¾.		
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	 	 P2(B)		=		0.9	P2(C)		+		0.5	P2(¬C).	 		 	 	 	 (7)		With	 P2(C)	 =	 1,	 we	 have	 P2(B)	 =	 0.9.	 The	 latter	 implies	 that	 the	 second-order	probability	of	A	will	be	less	than	the	first-order	probability:			 P2(A)		=	0.9	×		0.9	+	0.5	×	0.1	=	0.86.	 	 	 	 	 (8)		At	 the	third	 level,	P3(D)	=	1,	 	P3(C)	=	0.9,	P3(B)	=	0.86,	and	finally	P3(A)	=	0.844.	 It	might	seem	that	we	are	getting	nowhere	in	our	attempt	to	find	a	definitive	value	for	the	subjective	probability	that	S	=	500500.	However	nothing	could	be	further	from	the	truth.	The	following	table	not	only	shows	how	the	higher-order	probabilities	of	
A	 decrease	 as	 the	 order	 increases,	 but	 also	 that	 they	 approach	 a	 definite	 value	greater	than	zero:			Order	n	of		probability		 1	 2	 3	 5	 10	 infinite	number	
nth	order	proby.	of	A			 0.9	 0.86	 0.844	 0.835	 0.83334	 0.83333....	=	5/6			 	 Table	1:	Decreasing	higher-order	probabilities	of	A				It	can	indeed	be	proved	that,	in	the	limit,	P*(A)	is	equal	to	5/6.		 Our	 table	 goes	 counter	 to	 Hume’s	 contention	 that	 the	 probability	 of	 the	original	 belief	 always	 goes	 to	 zero.	 In	 addition,	 and	 this	 is	 the	 important	 point,	 it	shows	that	there	is	something	that	does	diminish	to	zero	as	the	chain	increases.	This	is	not	the	justification	of	the	belief	in	A,	as	Meeker	thought,	nor	its	vigour,	as	Owen	and	 Garrett	 have	 claimed.	 Rather	 it	 is	 the	 effect	 of	 higher-order	 doubtings	 on	Maurice’s	 credence	 in	 A.	 The	 higher	 the	 doubt	 is,	 that	 is	 the	 more	 intermediate	doubtings	there	are,	the	smaller	is	its	incremental	effect	on	the	final	value	of	P(A).			 The	details	can	be	read	off	from	Table	1.	There	we	see	that	at	the	first	level	the	probability	is	0.9;	but	when	we	go	to	second	order	the	value	of	the	probability	is	reduced	to	0.86,	which	means	that	the	second-order	(negative)	correction	is	0.04.	At	the	 third	 order,	 the	 value	 goes	 down	 still	 further	 to	 0.844,	 so	 the	 third	 order	contributes	 	 a	 correction	 of	 	 0.86	−	 0.844	 =	 0.016	 to	 the	 second-order	 value.	 The	combined	 effect	 of	 the	 sixth	 to	 the	 tenth	 orders,	 as	 can	 be	 seen	 from	 the	 table,	produces	a	correction	of	less	than	two	parts	in	a	thousand.			 In	Table	1	 the	higher-order	values	of	 the	probability	become	smaller	as	 the	number	of	doubtings	grows,	but	this	is	not	invariably	so.	Whether	they	do	depends	on	the	values	of	the	conditional	and	unconditional	probabilities.	In	the	construction	of	 Table	 1	we	 set	 Pn(A|B),	 Pn(B|C),	 Pn(C|D),	 and	 so	 on,	 all	 equal	 to	 0.9;	 Pn(A|¬B),	Pn(B|¬C),	Pn(C|¬D),	and	so	on,	were	all	0.5,	while	P1(B),	P2(C),	P3(D),	and	so	on,	were	equal	to	one.	If	however	we	choose	as	values	0.8,	0.3	and	0.5	respectively	(where	the	last	 reflects	 the	 idea	 that	Maurice	 initially	 thinks	he	might	be	 just	 as	well	 right	as	wrong),	then	this	would	lead	to	Table	2:				
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Order	n	of		probability	 1	 2	 3	 5	 10	 infinite	number	
nth	order	proby.	of	A			 0.55	 0.575	 0.588	 0.597	 0.5999	 0.6	=	3/5			 	 Table	2:	Increasing	higher-order	probabilities	of	A			
	Here	 the	 probability	 goes	 up	 rather	 than	 down	 as	 the	 number	 of	 doubtings	increases.	Moreover,	as	in	Table	1,	the	value	of	P*(A)	is	a	well-defined	number,	and	this	 is	what	 usually	 happens.33	 Although	 these	 probabilities	 increase	 as	 the	 order	increases,	the	contribution	of	the	higher	orders	to	the	final	value	of	the	probability	of	
A	 still	 decreases,	 as	 can	 be	 seen	 from	Table	 2.	 Further	 it	 can	 be	 proved	 that	 this	value,	after	an	infinite	number	of	doubtings,	does	not	depend	at	all	on	whether	we	set	P1(B),	P2(C),	P3(D),	and	so	on,	equal	to	a	half	or	to	one:	it	is	a	function	solely	of	the	conditional	probabilities.		 Both	tables	illustrate	that	the	probability	of	the	original	belief	not	only	fails	to	go	to	zero,	but	generally	approaches	a	positive	number	that	 is	unique	and	well-defined.	Moreover,	they	show	that	there	is	something	that	invariably	diminishes	as	the	chain	of	doubtings	increases,	namely	the	effect	of	higher-order	doubtings	on	the	probability	 that	 the	sum	S	 is	equal	 to	500500.	The	 further	away	a	 level	 is	 from	A,	that	is	the	more	intermediate	doubtings	there	are,	the	smaller	is	its	influence	on	the	final	value	of	the	probability	of	A.	Moreover	the	tables	show	that	the	approach	to	the	limit	 can	 be	 rather	 rapid.	 This	 should	 remove	 any	 feeling	 of	 uneasiness	 that	 one	might	have	about	drawing	conclusions	from	reasoning	that	goes	on	forever.	In	line	with	 Hume’s	 claim	 that	 the	 diminution	 already	 occurs	 in	 a	 finite	 sequence	 of	doubting,	the	tables	show	that	we	do	not	need	to	go	all	the	way	to	infinity	in	order	to	see	 the	effect	 that	we	have	been	 talking	about:	 a	 few	steps	are	enough	 to	 suggest	that	 a	 regress	 of	 higher	 and	 higher-order	 probabilities	 converges	 to	 a	 non-zero	value.34	Also,	a	few	steps	suffice	to	indicate	that	the	significance	of	the	higher	orders	diminishes	as	their	number	increases.	In	this	sense,	then,	it	is	correct	that	something	goes	to	zero	in	the	process.	It	 is	 just	not	the	probability	of	A,	or	the	justification	of	the	belief	in	A;	nor	is	it	the	force	or	vigour	of	that	belief.	Rather	it	is	the	contribution	to	the	final	non-zero	value	by	the	successive	doubts.	
	
	
7.	Two	views		In	his	insightful	paper	on	‘Of	scepticism	with	regard	to	reason’,	David	Owen	writes:		 “As	 the	 number	 of	 intermediate	 ideas	 increases	 and	 the	 chain	 of	reasoning	becomes	longer,	the	relationship	between	the	ideas	at	each	end	of	the	chain	of	 ideas	becomes	more	indirect	and	the	certainty	of																																																									33	 The	 only	 situation	 in	 which	 this	 does	 not	 happen	 is	 when	 the	 (nonuniform)	 conditional	probabilities	in	the	chain	rapidly	approach	1,	that	is,	when	they	are	close	to	material	implications.	We	will	not	give	the	proofs,	since	again	the	point	can	be	readily	grasped	at	an	intuitive	level.		34	Of	course,	we	need	a	mathematical	proof	to	demonstrate	that	what	we	are	actually	observing	is	a	firm	fact	rather	than	a	fluctuation.	But	this	has	been	provided.	
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the	conclusion	is	lessened.”35		Owen	may	well	be	right	that	this	is	what	Hume	had	envisaged.	If	so,	however,	then	it	is	clear	that	Hume	fails	to	discriminate	between	a	valid	and	an	invalid	version	of	his	argument.	 For	modern	 probability	 theory	 teaches	 us	 that	 the	 first	 part	 of	 Owen’s	sentence	hits	the	mark,	but	the	second	part	is	false.	It	is	indeed	the	case	that,	as	the	chain	becomes	 longer,	 the	relationship	between	the	 ideas	at	each	end	of	 the	chain	becomes	 less	 direct.	 It	 is	 however	 not	 so	 that	 the	 certainty	 of	 the	 conclusion	 is	lessened.	No	matter	how	long	the	chain	is,	the	conclusion	can	still	be	almost	certain,	and	moreover	be	believed	with	great	 force	and	vivacity.	 If	 the	above	quotation	by	Owen	correctly	represents	Hume’s	view,	which	in	our	opinion	is	very	likely,	then	it	reveals	 that	 Hume	 failed	 to	 distinguish	 between	 a	 diminishing	 influence	 on	 the	probability	of	the	conclusion	and	a	diminishing	probability	of	the	conclusion	itself.		 There	 are	 more	 indications	 in	 Owen’s	 text	 that	 Hume	 failed	 to	 make	 this	distinction.	 For	 example,	Owen	 states	 that	 the	 negative	 arguments	 in	Hume’s	 text	“threaten	to	lessen	the	degree	of	force	and	vivacity	characteristic	of	our	beliefs”	and	show			 “how	our	degree	of	confidence	in	our	beliefs	might	lessen	on	reflection”.36				This	appears	 to	refer	 to	 the	diminution	of	 the	original	belief,	P(A),	which	we	have	deemed	 incorrect,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 violates	 the	 probability	 calculus.	 But	 Owen	also	takes	Hume	as	saying:			 “as	 the	 number	 of	 steps	 required	 to	 reduce	 the	 probability	 of	 our	judgements	 to	 zero	 approaches	 infinity,	 so	 its	 influence	 on	 our	 beliefs	gets	vanishingly	small”.37			If	this	means	that	the	influence	of	each	successive	step	reduces	(rather	than	that	the	influence	of	all	the	steps	together	lessens),	then	it	is	in	line	with	the	calculus.	On	the	other	hand,	however,	when	Owen	writes	“In	Hume’s	case,	…	length	and	complexity	lessen	the	certainty	with	which	the	conclusion	of	an	argument	is	held”,	this	is	again	incorrect.38	 For,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 a	 conclusion	 can	 be	 almost	 certain,	 even	 if	 it	follows	from	a	long	chain	of	reasoning.		 There	are	thus	two	views	on	what	exactly	diminishes	in	an	argument	based	on	iterated	probabilities,	a	correct	and	an	incorrect	one.	According	to	the	latter,	the	thing	 that	 diminishes	 is	 the	 probability,	 or	 the	 justification,	 or	 the	 vivacity	 of	 the	original	belief.	According	to	the	former,	what	diminishes	is	the	effect	that	successive	links	in	the	chain	have.	The	more	remote	a	link	is,	the	smaller	is	its	contribution	to	the	probability	or	justification,	which	may	however	continue	to	be	close	to	one.	
																																																								35	Owen	2015,	120.		36	Owen	1999,	175,	196.	37	Ibid.,	195,	our	italics.	38	Owen	2015,	132,	note	38.	
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	 Which	 of	 these	 two	 views	 did	 Hume	 have	 in	 mind?	 The	 fact	 that	 a	 Hume	authority	 like	 Owen	 does	 not	 distinguish	 the	 one	 from	 the	 other,	 and	 apparently	without	being	aware	of	 it	 goes	back	and	 forth	between	 them,	 suggests	 that	Hume	himself	failed	to	make	the	distinction.	This	failure	is	of	course	understandable,	given	the	rather	rudimentary	nature	of	probability	theory	in	the	eighteenth	century.	True,	knowledge	 of	 the	 calculus	 is	 not	 really	 required	 to	 make	 the	 distinction,	 but	 it	certainly	simplifies	the	job.	Be	that	as	it	may,	the	distinction	between	the	two	views	is	of	major	importance	for	Hume's	regress	argument:	on	the	one	view	the	argument	is	formally	valid,	whereas	on	the	other	it	is	not.			 The	distinction	in	question	also	sheds	light	on	a	recent	discussion	about	the	meaning	of	the	term	‘evidence’	as	it	occurs	in	‘Of	scepticism	with	regard	to	reason’.	What	is	this	evidence	of	which	Hume	says	that	it	is	weakened	until	at	last	it	becomes	totally	extinct?	Should	we	interpret	it	in	a	straightforwardly	epistemological	way,	i.e.	as	‘evidential	grounds’?	Or	is	it	a	more	subjective	notion,	as	Garrett	and	Owen	have	argued,	corresponding	to	“psychological	‘evidentness’,	not	the	external	basis	of	such	evidentness”?39	 David	 Owen	 aptly	 pointed	 out	 that	 difficulties	 would	 arise	 if	 we	were	to	choose	the	first	option:			 “How	could	a	subsequent	judgment	affect	the	original	evidence,	when	‘evidence’	is	treated	as	‘evidential	grounds’?	It	is	not	as	if	the	original	evidence	turns	out	to	be	false	or	misleading:	it	is	just	that	it	ceases	to	have	 the	 effect	 on	 it	 that	 it	 originally	 did.	What	 is	 weakened	 is	 my	confidence	or	degree	of	belief	in	the	the	first	judgment”40		Kevin	Meeker,	on	the	other	hand,	 is	quick	to	note	that	confidence	only	weakens	in	reaction	to	the	supposed	weakening	of	evidential	grounds:		 “…	if	the	evidential	grounds	are	not	weakened,	then	it	is	puzzling	why	our	 confidence	 should	 be	 weakened.	 In	 other	 words,	 why	 does	 the	
evidentness	 falter	 if	 it	 is	 not	 because	 we	 see	 the	 lack	 of	 supporting	evidential	grounds?”41		As	seen	from	the	correct	view	on	what	exactly	diminishes,	both	parties	have	a	point	in	 criticizing	 the	 other.	 Interpreting	 ‘evidence’	 as	 subjective	 “confidence”	 or	 as	“degree	 of	 belief	 in	 the	 first	 judgment”	 leads	 to	 problems;	 but	 it	 is	 no	 less	troublesome	 to	 construe	 the	 term	 as	 the	more	 objective	 ‘evidential	 grounds’.	 The	former	 interpretation	 implies,	 in	 our	 example,	 that	 what	 weakens	 and	 ultimately	vanishes	is	our	belief	in	the	proposition	that	S	equals	500500	(A).	The	latter	implies	that	what	weakens,	and	ultimately	vanishes,	are	the	higher-order	probabilities.	Both	implications	are	incorrect,	as	we	have	seen.	There	is	no	reason	why	we	should	not	be	very	confident	that	S	equals	500500,	and	there	is	no	reason	why	the	higher-order	probabilities	 should	not	have	 large	values.	What	weakens	and	 finally	vanishes	are																																																									39	Garrett	2015,	225.	40	Owen	2004,	15.		Cf.	Garrett	1997.	41	Meeker	2000,	225.	
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the	corrections	that	the	higher-order	probabilities	make	to	the	degree	of	our	belief	in	A.			
8.	Summary	and	conclusion		According	to	Hume’s	iterative	probability	argument	in	Treatise	1.4.1,	a	sequence	of	subjective	 probability	 judgements	 over	 subjective	 probability	 judgements	 will,	 if	continued	 ad	 infinitum,	 reduce	 the	 original	 belief	 to	 nothing.	 Among	 the	 many	controversies	 surrounding	 this	 argument,	 there	 is	 the	 disagreement	 about	 the	appropriate	method	for	its	evaluation.	Should	we	or	should	we	not	use	formal	tools,	in	particular	those	drawn	from	probability	theory?		 In	this	paper	we	have	to	a	certain	extent	sided	with	the	formalists,	as	we	have	called	 them	 for	 convenience.	 ‘To	 a	 certain	 extent’,	 because	 our	 path	 is	 also	 very	different	 from	 theirs.	 Some	 formalists	 assumed	 the	 argument	 to	 be	 valid,	 on	 the	grounds	 that	a	product	of	probability	values	all	 less	 than	one	 tends	 to	zero.	Other	formalists	have	however	observed	that	there	are	exceptions	to	this	rule:	under	some	circumstances	 such	 a	 product	 gives	 a	 number	 greater	 than	 zero;	we	 have	 argued	that	their	observation	is	correct,	but	irrelevant	for	the	matter	at	hand.		 Our	 approach	 differs	 from	 both	 kinds	 of	 formalists.	 In	 trying	 to	 determine	how	 probable	 a	 proposition	 is,	 given	 some	 evidence,	 we	 should	 also	 take	 into	account	what	the	probability	of	the	proposition	would	be	if	the	evidence	were	false.	This	 leads	us	 to	 the	rule	of	 total	probability,	which	shows	 that	we	are	not	dealing	with	a	product	of	factors,	as	both	groups	incorrectly	assume,	but	rather	with	a	sum	of	 terms,	 each	 of	 which	 is	 a	 product	 of	 factors.	 If	 we	 iterate	 the	 rule	 of	 total	probability	infinitely	many	times,	we	see	that	it	generally	yields	a	probability	that	is	not	zero,	contrary	to	what	the	standard	formalists	maintain.	Moreover	the	iteration	reveals	 that	 there	 is	 something	 else	 that	 continually	 decreases	 until	 it	 finally	 dies	out,	namely	the	effect	of	higher-order	doubtings	on	the	original	probability.		 There	are	thus	two	different	views	about	what	exactly	 it	 is	 that	vanishes	 in	the	long	run.	Each	of	them	corresponds	to	a	different	formalization	of	the	iterative	probability	 argument.	 According	 to	 the	 incorrect	 standard	 formalization	 that	 we	gave	in	Section	3,	it	is	the	probability	of	the	target	that	diminishes.	According	to	the	corrected	 formalization	 in	 Section	 5,	 what	 lessens	 are	 the	 contributions	 of	 the	successive	higher-order	probabilities.		 The	two	different	views	of	what	vanishes	could	in	principle	be	distinguished	without	using	formal	tools,	but	the	job	becomes	much	easier	once	we	have	availed	ourselves	 of	 contemporary	probability	 theory.	Moreover	we	 can	now	 see	 that	 the	one	 view	 is	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 calculus	 whereas	 the	 other	 is	 not.	 For	 the	eighteenth	century	Hume,	the	latter	was	out	of	reach.				
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